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THE PRODUCT LIABILITY MEss: How BUSINESS CAN BE REsCUED 
FROM THE PoLmcs OF STATE COURTS. By Richard Neely. New 
York: The Free Press. 1988. Pp. ix, 181. $24.95. 
Judge Richard Neely's1 latest book provides a political blueprint 
for overhauling current product liability law. Like Neely's earlier 
works, this book is not directed at the legal community;2 rather, the 
author intends that the work furnish the business community with a 
new strategy to bring about product liability law reform. The sub-
stance of Neely's proposed reform is unoriginal: he suggests adopting 
a national law of product liability.3 It is his proposed means of imple-
menting the change that is unique. 
The author identifies a structural deficiency in the current product 
liability system as the primary justification for reform. 4 Because of the 
1. Other books by Judge Richard Neely include THE DIVORCE DECISION (1984), How 
CoURTS GOVERN AMERICA (1981), WHY CoURTS DON'T WORK (1983), and JUDICIAL JEOP-
ARDY (1986). Judge Richard Neely was elected to the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals 
in 1972 at the age of 31. He served as Chief Justice in 1980 and 1985. Between graduation from 
Yale Law School and his election to the West Virginia Supreme Court, Judge Neely served in the 
Army as an artillery captain, practiced law as a solo practitioner, and, in 1970, served one term 
in the West Virginia Legislature. Judge Neely is also a professor of economics at the University 
of Charleston. 
2. Nor does Neely claim the book is a work oflegal scholarship; indeed, he begins the book 
with the statement that "Larry Tribe and Richard Epstein, two leading constitutional theorists, 
can't write this book. . . . [T]oo much brilliance, and too nice a regard for the intricacies oflegal 
theories, can affect a person's appreciation of how to deliver a bold blow to the political jugular." 
P. 1. Epstein has commented on the area, however, in discussing the likelihood of the Supreme 
Court limiting the area of punitive damages. He thinks it unlikely that the Court will become 
involved: " 'To get involved is like hugging a tar baby • . . • Conservative justices will be reluctant 
to use constitutional law to intervene in an historically states' rights area, and liberals will be 
wary of interfering with justice.' " Olson, Punitive Damages: How Much Is Too Much?, Bus. 
WK., Mar. 27, 1989, at 54, 56 (quoting Epstein). The Supreme Court's recent refusal to apply 
the excessive fines clause of the eighth amendment to reduce an award of punitive damages 
supports Epstein's position. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 109 S. 
Ct. 2909, 2914 (1989). 
3. Many of the advantages of a federal system of product liability have been noted in earlier 
works. See, e.g., Reed & Watkins, Product Liability Tort Reform: The Case for Federal Action, 
63 NEB. L. REV. 389 (1984). Neely's proposed reform is comparatively mild; he does not join 
the group of reformers advocating wholesale replacement of current tort law. See, e.g., 
Sugarman, Doing Away with Tort Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 555 (1985) (advocating replacement of 
current tort law with a compensation system). Instead, Neely praises liability law for making 
"the United States the safest country in the world." P. 9. Later in the book, he again voices 
support for the general concept of product liability law, stating that "[p]rotection from accidents 
for individuals, wealth redistribution to random victims, and product safety are desirable social 
goals." P. 118. 
4. P. 57. Neely does cite several other, less important factors that have increased the hazard 
to business from product liability claims. These include the increased capacity of the courts, and 
the proliferation of lawyers - in particular, the increase in the number of "dumb lawyers." Pp. 
21-23. The latter factor is important to the product liability issue because a "bunch of dumb 
lawyers are more likely to be ambulance chasers than they are to crowd the more intellectually 
demanding fields of taxation, administrative law, or corporate takeovers.'' P. 23. Neely's argu-
ment that more "dumb lawyers" are entering the field appears to be based on incorrect or out-
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inherently parochial nature of state courts, exacerbated by the fact 
that many state judges are elected, Neely contends that state courts 
are locked into a "competitive race to the bottom."5 Neely defines this 
"race" with a simple example. Allowing a paraplegic to collect a few 
hundred thousand dollars from the Michelin Tire Company, following 
a single-car crash of unexplained cause, permits Judge Neely a sound 
night of sleep. Michelin will likely survive, and if it doesn't, only the 
French will care. More important, Judge Neely's disabled constituent 
will have sufficient money to live out her life - and she, her family, 
and her friends will vote for Neely in future elections (pp. 1-4). In 
more general terms, Neely perceives state court judges as more than 
happy to redistribute out-of-state wealth to in-state constituents. 6 
And given a product liability system with standards "as fluid as Lake 
Michigan" (p. 20), courts have little trouble formulating decisions to 
further this objective. 
Neely's solution to this problem is neither surprising nor original. 
The author advocates replacing the current system of product liability 
law - in reality fifty-three separate systems of law - with a uniform, 
national common law of product liability. Federal courts would be 
given supervisory authority over the law, with state courts continuing 
to administer the law. Under such a system, federal courts, with their 
inherent national perspective, would be impervious to the pressures 
that lead to the "competitive race to the bottom." Not only are fed-
eral courts national in scope, but federal judges are lifetime appointees, 
unlike the majority of state court judges. The idea of a national com-
mon law of product liability has been advocated by others, 7 and it has 
dated information. According to Neely, fewer brilliant people are applying to law school, which 
suggests that the schools are accepting lower caliber applicants. Just the contrary appears to be 
true: according to a recent report from the Law School Admission Services, the number of 
applications to accredited law schools is continuing a "record-breaking" string of increases that 
began three or four years ago. The number of applications has increased 44.6% since 1986. The 
More the Merrier, STUDENT LAW., Feb. 1990, at 5-6. The increased applications, unaccompa-
nied by an increase in law school populations, would ordinarily portend increased competitive-
ness and selectivity in law school admissions. Neely fails to articulate why he feels the calibre of 
law students in general is declining, other than to relate the difficulties faced by his local law 
school in attracting qualified applicants. P. 23. 
5. Recognition of this perceived bias is well-established: 
However true the fact may be, that the tribunals of the states will administer justice as 
impartially as those of the nation, to parties of every description, it is not less true that the 
constitution itself either entertains apprehensions on this subject, or views with such indul-
gence the possible fears and apprehensions of suitors, that it has established national tribu-
nals for the decision of controversies between aliens and a citizen or between citizens of 
different states. 
Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 (5 Cranch) U.S. 61, 87 (1809). 
6. Neely, in his typically blunt style, later sets forth an even more aggressive agenda, stating 
that "(t]he best I can do, and I do it all the time, is make sure that my own state's residents get 
more money out of Michigan than Michigan residents get out of us." Pp. 71-72. 
7. See, e.g., Reed & Watkins, supra note 3. The tie between future U.S. competitiveness and 
lack of uniformity in product liability law was cited by Rep. Thomas Luken of Ohio in introduc-
ing recent legislation aimed at creating a national law of product liability. Gastel, Product Liabil-
ity Tort Reform, INS. INFO. INST. (May 1990). 
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been the subject of several unsuccessful bills in Congress. 8 
Neely diverges from the mainstream, however, in rejecting Con-
gress as the appropriate forum in which to bring about this reform.9 
In a chapter entitled ."Kiss Congress Goodbye" (pp. 80-105), he ex-
plains why Congress is unable to act in this area. The structure of 
Congress itself, according to Neely, favors the status quo by erecting 
numerous barriers to the passage of any legislation.10 Rather than 
throw up his hands in despair, though, Neely advocates bypassing 
Congress, with the federal judiciary acting unilaterally to create a na-
tional product liability law. 
This strategy for bringing about change is Neely's most controver-
sial suggestion. The legality of such a solution is doubtful. Neely him-
self seems to concede this point when he states that "I make no claim 
to having reconciled state sovereignty with a national law [of product 
liability]" (p. 107). Nevertheless, he cites New York Times Co. v. Sulli-
van 11 for the proposition that the Supreme Court has the power to 
rewrite state law when policy considerations mandate it (pp. 103-05). 
Yet, unlike libel law, product liability law does not implicate the first 
amendment or other overriding constitutional concems.12 
Neely replies to this objection with an analysis offederalism, divid-
ing the doctrine into three distinct schools of thought: historical fed-
eralism, result-oriented federalism, Band practical federalism (p. 118). 
The first two conceptions of federalism, Neely admits, do not support 
8. See, e.g., S. 666, lOOth Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); S. REP. No. 422, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1986); S. REP. No. 476, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984); S. REP. No. 670, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1982). 
9. Later in the book, Neely also rejects any reform based on a coordinated effort by the 
states. P. 159 (discussing the failure of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act). 
10. Support for this contention may be found in the public choice literature. See, e.g., W. 
EsKRIDGE & P. FRICKEY, LEGISLATION 368-77 (1988) (cyclical majorities, the gatekeeping 
power of committees, and strategic voting all work to obstruct implementing the will of the 
majority). Neely also identifies other impediments to legislative action, including the technical 
nature of the subject matter and the lobbying power of the American Trial Lawyers' Association. 
Pp. 80-81. 
11. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
12. Two recent Supreme Court decisions emphasize this point. In Florida Star v. B.J.F., 109 
S. Ct. 2603 (1989), the Court set aside an award of damages against a newspaper, even though 
the paper had published a rape victim's name in violation of a state statute. 109 S. Ct. at 2613. 
In upholding the right of the paper to publish such information, the Court found the first amend-
ment concern overriding. Decided the same term, Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco 
Disposal, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 2909 (1989), reaches a different result. Lacking the first amendment 
concern present in Florida Star, the Court refused to set aside or reduce a jury's determination of 
punitive damages in a private dispute. 109 S. Ct. at 2914. 
13. Neely's historical federalism is based on traditional ideas of federalism, whereby the fed-
eral government is a government of delegated powers. The doctrine is derived from the intent of 
the framers, who did not set out to create a strong, centralized government. P. 108. Result-
oriented federalism, on the other hand, is more fluid. Neely defines it as a convenient doctrine 
invoked by those opposing particular federal legislation. Under this concept of federalism, for 
example, those opposed to racial integration may raise federalism arguments if they believe more 
favorable treatment is available from the states. P. 111. 
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a court-enacted national common law of product liability. Yet practi-
cal federalism, which Neely defines as a doctrine chiefly directed at 
fostering competition among state governments (p. 112), lends support 
to Neely's proposal. In particular, one goal of practical federalism is 
preventing extortion of concessions by distributional coalitions (pp. 
113-14). And Neely's plan, with product liability law administered at 
a national level, furthers this objective by reducing the externalities 
resulting from the competitive race to the bottom.14 
Neely, again acknowledging the weakness of his position, retreats 
in the final chapter of the book, suggesting that Congress enact an 
empowering statute (pp. 169-71). Similar to the Sherman Act, the 
statute would be worded in general terms, granting the federal judici-
ary the right to fashion a national common law of product liability. 
Neely's concession to constitutional concerns is, however, short-lived. 
At the end of the proposal he states that although such a bill would be 
marginally easier to pass than a more detailed statute, it still is un-
likely to pass, and thus the solution ultimately must come from the 
federal judiciary (p. 173). · 
On a more general level, Neely's argument that a problem of suffi-
cient magnitude exists to justify his reform is not wholly persuasive. 
The author begins with the presumption that a product liability crisis 
is inevitable, but fails to provide much evidence to support this propo-
sition (p. 3). His argument appears to be based on his own proclivity 
for redistributing wealth to in-state plaintiffs, 15 generalized to encom-
pass a significant number of state appellate judges (p. 4). Taken to-
gether with the data "all around us" that product liability law is a 
hazard to the economy (p. 3), this desire to redistribute wealth seems 
sufficient to convince Neely that a crisis is at hand. 16 Yet there is 
much evidence that contradicts such a conclusion. 
Much of the analysis of the increase in product liability claims has 
14. Earlier in the book, Neely acknowledges that federal courts may exhibit some bias as 
well. For example, federal judges are typically local appointees and thus may feel some sense of 
obligation, or perhaps kinship, to in-state litigants. Yet he argues that this bias is diluted at the 
appellate level. P. 40. 
15. It is not entirely clear to what degree these factors play a role in Neely's decision making. 
A recent "clarification" in the ABA Journal suggests that Judge Neely may only be mimicking 
what he perceives to be an unspoken rationale other judges use. The Journal had quoted a 
passage from The Product Liability Mess in which Neely explained how redistributing out-of-
state wealth to in-state plaintiffs helps Neely's chances for reelection. The following month the 
Journal made it clear that the quote did not reflect Neely's personal views. Quotes, A.B.A. J., 
Jan. 1989, at 32. 
16. One observer has noted that "the claim that the rise in liability insurance rates can be 
adequately explained by higher tort awards appears to be based largely on anecdotes and conjec-
ture." Rabin, Some Reflections on the Process of Tort Reform, 25 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 13, 29 
(1988). Thus, Neely appears to have joined a crowd by presuming, without a solid basis, that 
liability law had precipitated a crisis. 
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focused on cases brought in federal court.17 But a mere two percent of 
the cases filed in the United States are filed in federal court, and an 
increase in activity in federal courts does not necessarily imply that a 
similar increase in state courts has occurred.18 Admittedly, at first 
glance the data on federal filings is alarming. From 1974 to 1985, 
product liability claims in federal courts increased 758%.19 Removing 
asbestos claims from the total, however, leads to a much different re-
sult; over one quarter of all product liability claims during this period 
were asbestos claims.20 By 1986, asbestos claims accounted for 43% 
of federal product liability claims. And, from 1985 to 1987 nonas-
bestos product liability claims in federal courts decreased 27%.21 
Neely himself supports litigants' pursuit of asbestos claims (p. 2). Fi-
nally, even if one still considers the data on federal claims alarming, 
evidence suggests that state courts have not suffered similar increases 
in claims. Tort claims as a whole in state courts increased nine per-
cent from 1978 to 1984; over the same period the population increased 
eight percent.22 
At this point, one cannot help but question the value of the book: 
little evidence supports the notion that there is a product liability cri-
sis, and even if a crisis is at hand, Neely's proposal for reform appears 
17. Comment, Rumors of Crises: Considering the Insurance Crisis and Tort Reform in an 
Information Vacuum, 37 EMORY L.J. 401, 415 (1988). 
18. Id. at 415-16 (1988). Yet many are willing to make this leap of faith. For example, a 
recent government report states that "[t]he growth in the number of [federal] product liability 
suits has been astounding. . . . There is no reason to believe that the state courts have not 
witnessed a similar dramatic increase in the number of product liability claims." REPORT OF 
THE TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP ON THE CAUSES, EXTENT, AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF 
THE CURRENT CRISIS IN INSURANCE AVAILABILITY AND AFFORDABILITY 45 (Feb. 1986). Em-
pirical evidence suggests otherwise: as a whole, federal court litigation has been increasing at a 
pace about four times that of state courts. J. GUINTHER, THE JURY IN AMERICA 164 (1988). 
19. Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REV. 3, 24 (1986). All 
other tort claims increased a relatively small 24% over the same period. Id. 
20. Galanter, The Life and Times of the Big Six; or, The Federal Courts Since the Good Old 
Days, 1988 Wis. L. Rev. 921, 939 (citing U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PRODUCT LIA-
BILITY: EXTENT OF "LmGATION EXPLOSION" IN FEDERAL CoURTS QUESTIONED 22 (1988)). 
21. Galanter, supra note 20, at 940, 941 n.77. 
22. Galanter, supra note 19, at 7. Unfortunately, the data available on state court claims 
does not separate product liability claims from all other tort claims. Nevertheless, the numbers 
suggest something other than a litigation crisis. Left unanswered, however, is the question of 
where the common perception of a product liability crisis originated. One possible explanation is 
the insurance industry itself. In 1986, the Insurance Information Institute spent $6.5 million 
dollars to promote the idea that a crisis was at hand. The Manufactured Crisis, 51 CONSUMER 
REP. 544, 545 (1986). And there is some speculation that some insurers even canceled policies 
on noneconomic grounds to strengthen the perception of a crisis. Abramowitz, W. Va. Sues 5 
Big Medical Insurers, Wash. Post, Apr. 15, 1986, at D4, col. 1. Economic self-interest appears to 
have been the industry's primary motivation. Comment, supra note 17, at 408. The industry 
may profit from a public perception of crisis. For instance, following a Delaware Supreme Court 
decision that appeared to enlarge potential director and officer liability, insurance companies that 
underwrote such coverage were able to raise premiums far in excess of their increased exposure. 
Put another way, these firms earned abnormally high returns as a result of a perception of crisis. 
Bradley & Schipani, The Relevance of the Duty of Care Standard in Corporate Governance, 75 
IOWA L. REV. 1, 55-56 (1989). 
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constitutionally infirm. Nevertheless, two aspects of The Product Lia-
bility Mess make the book worthwhile.23 
The author's strategy for change reveals useful insights into the 
judicial process. Part of Neely's strategy includes lobbying the judici-
ary. In Neely's view, judges are merely politicians and although the 
method of explaining proposals to the judiciary is different, bringing 
about change is nonetheless a lobbying exercise (pp. 149-50). Accord-
ing to the author, the "major difference between courts and other 
political institutions . . . is that it is not usually smart to try to bribe 
appointed judges" (p. 14). Neely's lobbying plan includes what he 
terms a "propaganda function," designed to inform the judiciary of 
the need for a national common law of product liability. Magazine 
articles, op-ed pieces, and The Product Liability Mess are all examples 
of this type of lobbying.24 . 
The idea that the judiciary can and should be lobbied by business is 
sure to provoke discussion. 25 Neely bemoans the inability of the judi-
ciary to gather information - so-called "legislative facts" - so neces-
sary to making intelligent decisions (pp. 139-41). In so doing, Neely 
reveals the importance of information about the world to his job as a 
decision maker; concomitantly, he reveals the frustration of the judici-
ary with its inability to gather such information. 
Moreover, Neely's candor throughout the book allows the reader 
an inside look at a modern legal realist at work. Neely provides the 
reader with an understanding of what is important to at least one sit-
ting state appellate judge in making decisions. Neely's work is unique 
if only for the fact that it comes from one who actively practices legal 
realism rather than from the "pointy-headed elite."26 Certainly, Neely 
overstates his position at times for effect, 27 but nevertheless the reader 
23. The following discussion is subject to one caveat: readers familiar with Neely's recent 
work Judicial Jeopardy will find that The Product Liability Mess offers little new material. 
24. The second prong of Neely's plan involves publication of academic articles in prominent 
law journals. Supporting this prong of the battle plan, Neely discusses a case he decided by 
adopting in its entirety a scheme described in a law review article. Actual implementation must 
then come about by bringing numerous test cases to court. P. 146. 
25. Justice William Brennan, for one, questions the value of trying to influence the outcome 
of a case through nonjudicial means. In discussing the recent demonstrations on the Courthouse 
steps, Justice Brennan commented: " 'It's such a sad waste of time. Those demonstrations don't 
affect a single vote.' " Rosellini, The Most Powelful Liberal in America, U.S. NEWS & WORLD 
REP., Jan. 8, 1990, at 27, 28. 
26. Judge Neely uses this term to describe academic commentators, who, the author con· 
tends, propose solutions that are often worse than the problem. P. 4. 
27. Neely seems to enjoy making bold statements: "One jerk-water Texas state trial court 
(with the obscene concurrence of a Texas court of appeals) has managed to screw up something 
bigger than many nation-states .... " P. 37 (discussing the Penzoil v. Texaco litigation). Later he 
discusses business lawyers who later become judges, commenting that even when business law· 
yers become judges they "often devote the rest of their lives to doing penance for having been 
business whores when they were young." P. 59. Neely is also not afraid to contradict himself; 
this last quote conflicts with an earlier statement, in which Neely asserts that once conservative 
or liberal judges are appointed, they "seldom change their spots." P. 26. 
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is left with the sense that Neely provides an accurate picture of how he 
go~ about his job. 2s 
The Product Liability Mess has one other redeeming aspect: despite 
its substantive flaws, the book is a pleasure to read. The work is di-
rect, confrontational at times, 29 and almost devoid of footnotes. In 
one of the author's earlier books he states that he "would prefer to be 
read rather than admired."30 Neely's latest work appears destined to 
realize that objective. 
- Matthew Harris 
28. Other appellate judges have also provided valuable insights into the judicial process. See, 
e.g., B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921); J. FRANK, COURTS ON 
TRIAL (1949); R. POSNER, FEDERAL COURTS (1985). 
29. Perhaps Neely is continuing a family tradition in this aspect. Although he provides no 
details, he does note early in the book that his own grandfather (it is not clear if this is the same 
grandfather who was a U.S. Senator) was expelled from the West Virginia University College of 
Law for whistling "Dixie" on campus. P. 31. One might imagine Grandfather Neely's rendition 
of "Dixie" was furnished for more than mere musical entertainment. 
30. R. NEELY, How CoURTS GOVERN AMERICA xii (1981). 
